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INTRODUCTION: HOW WE VOTE: ELECTRONIC VOTING
AND OTHER VOTING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
Davison M. Douglas*
In recent years, election law has assumed a particularly prominent role in
American political life.' For example, election-related litigation has sharply in-
creased during the past decade, and the winner of a number of high-profile elections
has been determined following litigation, including, most prominently, the presiden-
tial election of 2000 and the gubernatorial election in Washington in 2004.2 This
issue of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal is devoted to a consideration of
various legal issues that arise out of the way in which we vote in the United States,
with a particular focus on issues that arise out of the use of electronic voting
technology. Because of the multi-disciplinary aspects of the question of how we
vote, this symposium includes scholars from the fields of law, political science, and
computer science.
One of the most interesting developments in election law in recent years has been
the increasing use of electronic voting technologies. Although promoted for their
vote-counting accuracy, electronic voting technologies have raised concerns in recent
years about system failure, or worse, system fraud. As one contributor to this sym-
posium, computer scientist Dan Wallach, has noted, "[a]ny voting system must be
designed to resist a variety of failures, ranging from inadvertent misconfiguration
to intentional tampering."3 Several of the contributors to this symposium address
questions that arise out of the use of electronic voting technology.
In his Article, "Voting SystemRisk Assessment Via Computational Complexity
Analysis," Wallach examines the security risks posed by a variety of different voting
technologies, and considers which technologies require "more attention to counter-
measures and mitigation strategies" to avoid fraud.4 Among the voting methodologies
that Wallach considers are electronic voting (with and without paper trails), optical
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. Douglas served
as Director of William and Mary's Election Law Program from 2005 until 2008. The William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journal expresses its appreciation to the Deer Creek Foundation for
its financial support for this symposium.
l See generally Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S.
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 937 (2005).
2 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2008); Wash. State Republican Party v. King County
Div. of Records, 103 P.3d 725 (Wash. 2004).
3 Dan S. Wallach, Voting System RiskAssessment Via Computational ComplexityAnalysis,
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 325, 325 (2008).
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scanned paper ballots (either with in-precinct scanning devices, or off-site scanning
devices), and Internet-based voting schemes. Wallach also explores future crypto-
graphic techniques that might help prevent voter fraud. Wallach's work contributes
to the growing literature addressing means of ensuring voting integrity in the wake
of the use of increasingly sophisticated electronic voting technologies.
Three contributions to this symposium examine the use of electronic voting tech-
nology in the context of specific elections. In their Article, "Voting Technology and
the 2008 New Hampshire Primary," three political scientists, Michael Herron, Walter
Mebane, and Jonathan Wand, explore claims that the vote counts in the 2008 presi-
dential primaries in New Hampshire were affected by the type of vote-tabulating tech-
nologies in use in various precincts across the state.' During that primary, Democratic
candidate Hillary Clinton, compared to her chief competitor Barack Obama, fared
considerably better in precincts using Accuvote optical scan vote-tabulating technology
than she did in precincts using hand-counted paper ballots. Similarly, Republican
candidate Mitt Romney, compared to his chief competitor John McCain, fared con-
siderably better in precincts using Accuvote optical scan technology than he did in
precincts using hand-counted paper ballots. The authors conclude that these tabula-
tion discrepancies are not due to the type of tabulation method used, but rather can
be explained by the demographic and political differences between precincts using
optical scan technologies and those using hand-counted paper ballots that reflect
different voter preferences. They specifically note that precincts using optical scan
technologies were disproportionately from southeast New Hampshire and tended
to be more densely populated and affluent than those precincts using paper ballots.
Hence, demographic differences explain the variation in result, a conclusion supported
by an examination of prior New Hampshire elections that produced similar divergent
voting patterns. The work of Herron, Mebane, and Wand is important; further work
of this type needs to be done as a way of monitoring the effect that divergent voting
technologies might have on election outcomes.
Two contributions to this symposium examine the disputed 2006 congressional
election in the 13th House District in Florida that resulted in extensive post-election
challenges. That election was decided by 369 votes out of approximately a quarter of
a million total votes cast.6 The post-election controversy arose because in the home
county of the losing candidate, a county where she enjoyed particularly strong sup-
port, an unusually high number of voters did not cast a vote in the congressional
election. Given the narrow margin, some observers argued that the election would
have come out differently had all votes been properly tabulated. The precincts in
question used paperless electronic touchscreen voting systems, and allegations were
' Michael C. Herron, Walter R. Mebane, Jr. & Jonathan N. Wand, Voting Technology
and the 2008 New Hampshire Primary, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 351 (2008).
6 See Lloyd Dunkelberger, Buchanan Declared Winner; Rival Jenning Sues, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.), Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
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made that the large number of undervotes was due to voting machine tabulation
failure. In his Article for this symposium, "Machine Errors and Undervotes in Florida
2006 Revisited," political scientist Walter Mebane addresses one of the most common
explanations for the undervotes: poor ballot design that caused many voters to fail to
cast a vote in the congressional contest.7 Mebane challenges the conclusion that poor
ballot design was the cause of the large number of undervotes, noting that "recorded
events involving power failures and problems with the Personalized Electronic Ballots
used with the machines correlate significantly with undervote rates."' Mebane does
not conclude that such failures definitively caused the undervotes. Rather, he con-
cludes that "[t]he relationships between machine events and undervotes are suffi-
ciently substantial and varied to make it unreasonable to discount the likelihood that
mechanical failures contributed substantially to the high numbers of undervotes."9
Mebane cautions that more extensive examination of the hardware and software
used in the electronic voting machines, which was not permitted, would be necessary
to draw more definitive conclusions about the cause of the Florida undervotes.
Mebane' s Article is significant, not simply because of what it might suggest about the
validity of the recorded outcome in the 2006 Florida congressional race, but for what
it might suggest more broadly about the possibility of machine failure when electronic
voting technologies are deployed.
Jessica Ring Amunson and Sam Hirsch, both attorneys with the Jenner and Block
law firm, represented the losing candidate in her unsuccessful post-election litigation
in the disputed 2006 Florida congressional contest. In their Article, "The Case of
the Disappearing Votes: Lessons from the Jennings v. Buchanan Congressional
Election Contest," Amunson and Hirsch critically assess the procedures used during
the post-election litigation. ° In particular, they argue that the trial judge's failure to
permit the plaintiffs' experts to examine the hardware, software, and source code of
the questionable voting machines undermined the ability of the litigants to get to the
bottom of the cause of the undervotes. Based on their post-election litigation experi-
ence in the Florida case, Amunson and Hirsch offer a list of proposals for reforming
the process by which election results are challenged. Among their list of proposed
reforms is the suggestion that courts should not use trade secret law to block judicial
discovery that would permit an examination of the hardware, software, and source
code of electronic voting machines. Without such discovery, they argue, litigants
7 Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Machine Errors and Undervotes in Florida 2006 Revisited, 17
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 375 (2008).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Jessica Ring Amunson & Sam Hirsch, The Case of the Disappearing Votes: Lessons
from the Jennings v. Buchanan Congressional Election Contest, 17 WM. & MARY BiL RTs.
J. 397 (2008).
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are sharply constrained in their ability to determine whether some type of machine
failure has in fact occurred.
Political scientist Paul Gronke, in his contribution to the symposium, "Early
Voting Reforms and American Elections," examines another voting issue: voting
prior to election day." In fact, a substantial number of states now permit early voting
(in addition to the traditional use of absentee ballots), a phenomenon that shows no
signs of abating.' 2 Among other issues, Gronke analyzes the impact of early voting
on the way in which candidates must conduct their campaigns, and poses questions
that researchers in the future might undertake with respect to early voting.
Legal scholar Dan Tokaji, in his Article, "Voter Registration and Election
Reform," takes on a topic that has been under-analyzed by election-law scholars:
voter registration laws.'3 Tokaji examines in considerable detail the legal apparatus
that governs the voter registration process and sets forth a range of potential
reforms, including registration portability (that would permit voters to transfer
registration to a new address on election day), automatic voter registration when
voters interface with the government, election-day registration, and compulsory or
universal voter registration.
Finally, legal scholars Christopher Elmendorf and Edward Foley, in their Article,
"Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological
Uncertainty on the High Court," consider the methodological approaches that var-
ious Justices on the United States Supreme Court use when adjudicating cases in-
volving the constitutionality of state or federal regulations of the election process. 4
Elmendorf and Foley argue that in these cases, the Justices appear to engage in what
they refer to as "methodological pluralism," pursuant to which the Justices follow
no single interpretive approach when considering the constitutionality of election
regulations. 5 As they argue of the Court's recent decision involving an Indiana photo
" Paul Gronke, Early Voting Reforms and American Elections, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 423 (2008).
12 See, e.g., The Early Voting Information at Reed College, Absentee and Early Voting
Laws, http://earlyvoting.net/blog (follow "State early voting laws" hyperlink) (last visited
Dec. 3, 2008) (noting that thirty-two states permit no-excuse, in-person early voting, fourteen
additional states permit excuse-required, in-person early voting, and one state does all voting
by mail); Michael Luo, In Florida and Elsewhere, Early Voting Breaks Records, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2008, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/03/in-fla-and-elsewhere-early-
voting-breaks-records/?emc=etal (estimating that 37% of registered voters in Florida voted
early in November 2008).
'3 Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILLRTs.
J. 453 (2008).
'4 Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM.
& MARY BaL RTs. J. 507 (2008).
15 Id.
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identification requirement as a prerequisite for voting,' 6 "the highly fragmented out-
come in Crawford, and the intense methodological disagreement that accompanied
it, only exacerbated the perception that the Court is literally lawless-without any law
for it to follow-when deciding election cases."' 7 This a significant charge, and one
that the Court must be mindful of as it continues to take up election law cases.
The Articles in this symposium ask more questions than they answer, but the
questions are important ones and are intended to help drive the scholarly inquiry
into various issues that relate to how we vote.
16 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
'7 Elmendorf & Foley, supra note 14, at 538.
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